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CAUTIONARY TALES OF
ADOPTION: ADDRESSING THE




A. THE TALE OF THE TEENAGE FATHER AND MOTHER'
In early May 2003, Mike and his longtime girlfriend, Mary, went
to their high school prom. Mike, age seventeen, and Mary, age sixteen,
had been flirting at the edges of a sexual relationship for many months.
That night, despite the best intentions, the months-long buildup of
sexual tension and the romantic atmosphere of the prom combined to
push them over the edge. They had unprotected sex. By August 2003,
they realized that Mary was pregnant and together, Mary and Mike
informed their parents. Both sets of parents were upset. Mary talked
alternately about ending the pregnancy, placing the baby for adoption,
and keeping the baby. Mike encouraged her to keep the baby or to
allow him, with the support of his parents, to raise the baby.
As the pregnancy progressed, Mike and Mary's relationship
became increasingly strained. Mary's parents, upset about the
pregnancy, sought to have Mike charged with statutory rape. When
* James E. Rogers Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Idaho College
of Law. I would like to thank my research assistant, Charlene Davis, J.D. 2004, for her
assistance with the early research on this Article.
1. This cautionary tale is based on the facts of In re Williams, No. CV 2004-077,
Or. Vacating Or. Relating to Father's Parental Rights (Idaho Dist. Ct. 3d Dist. Mar. 31,
2004) (this order, affidavits, and other filings in this case are on file with the author).
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that failed, Mary's parents threatened to have Mike arrested for
harassing Mary by his constant attempts to stay in communication with
her. By December 2003, Mike and Mary were not communicating
with each other at all.
When their relationship deteriorated, Mike became increasingly
concerned that Mary would place the baby for adoption and that he
would lose the opportunity to father his child. With his parents, Mike
contacted an attorney who advised him to register in Idaho's putative
father registry, to offer financial support to Mary during her pregnancy,
and to be prepared, upon the baby's birth, to pay child support for the
child. Mike followed this advice and registered, offered in writing to
provide support to Mary, cover expenses of her pregnancy, and
prepared himself to pay child support. In the meantime, Mike
continued his efforts to communicate with Mary. As the time for the
birth drew near, Mike and his family began to regularly check with the
two local hospitals to discover whether the child had been born.
Unbeknownst to Mike, in November 2003, Mary's family began
efforts to place the baby out of state through a private adoption. The
family, through intermediaries, made contact with a couple from a
distant state and finalized arrangements for this couple to adopt the
child. The child was born on February 2, 2004. The prospective
adoptive parents were in the delivery room at the time of the birth.
Later on the same day as the birth, the prospective adoptive parents
filed a petition to terminate Mike's parental rights with the court in a
nearby county. The prospective adoptive parents moved for an
expedited hearing on the petition and informed the judge that they did
not intend to provide notice to the father. The prospective adoptive
parents led the judge to believe that the father "reconsidered" his
earlier interest in parenting the child that had caused him to file in the
putative father registry. In any case, the prospective adoptive parents
argued that Idaho's putative father statute required that in order to be
entitled to notice of a parental termination action or an adoption, an
unwed father must both register and initiate a paternity action. Because
Mike failed to initiate a paternity action, the prospective adoptive
parents argued that Mike was not entitled to notice. Three days later,
after a brief hearing, the judge entered an order terminating Mike's
parental rights and sealing the record of the case. The prospective
adoptive parents left the state of Idaho and, upon returning to their
home state, initiated an action to adopt the child.
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By February 9, 2004, Mike had grown so frustrated with his
inability to discover whether Mary had delivered their baby yet that he
went to her home despite earlier threats that the police would be called.
When he arrived, he was told for the first time that the child was born
on February 2 and had been placed for adoption "out of state."
Mike immediately filed a paternity action in his home county and
a motion to unseal the record and have the judgment terminating his
parental rights set aside. The court unsealed the record and set the
judgment aside based on its finding that Mike was entitled to notice of
the action because of his registration. The case was transferred to
Mike's home county and combined with the paternity action. The
court in that case ordered the birth mother to secure the return of the
child to Idaho. After some procedural wrangling, the North Carolina
court in which an adoption petition had been filed, dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction and the child (age three months) was
returned to Idaho and placed in Mike's custody.
B. THE TALE OF THE CONFLICTED MOTHER AND FATHER
2
On December 7, 2001, Jane informed John that she was pregnant
with his child.3 At the time, Jane lived in Pocatello, while John lived
in Idaho Falls.4  They were not married, but the couple had been
involved in a sexual relationship for over three years.5
Jane and John were conflicted about the pregnancy. At one point,
John asked Jane to move in with him.6 Jane declined his offer.7 They
discussed keeping the child and John purchased a baby carrier, stroller,
clothes, and other items before the baby's birth.8 Jane and John
continued to see each other during the pregnancy and alternately
discussed keeping the baby or placing the baby for adoption.
9
Late in the pregnancy, Jane decided she would place the baby for
2. This cautionary tale is based on the facts of Doe v. Roe Fam. Servs., 88 P.3d
749 (Idaho 2004).
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adoption when it was born.10 Jane sought counseling from Roe Family
Services (RFS) and began steps to place the baby through the agency. " I
Pursuant to their service agreement, RFS covered Jane's medical
expenses during the pregnancy.12 As Jane's due date approached, John
pressured Jane to keep the baby. 13 Jane became more and more
undecided.14 John also vacillated between adoption and keeping the
baby; he went to RFS at Jane's request and participated in the selection
of adoptive parents. 15 But, by June 2002, John decided he wanted to
keep the baby.
16
Jane and John agreed to keep the baby when he was born on July
31, 2002.17 They notified RFS of their decision. 18 On August 2, 2002,
while still at the hospital, Jane and John both filled out an
Acknowledgment of Paternity Application that requested the father's
name be recorded as the father on the baby's birth certificate.
19
Jane and John spent time together with the baby between August
2 and August 9, 2002.20 However, on August 8, 2002, Jane called RFS
and advised the agency that she did, in fact, want to place the baby for
adoption.2 1 On the same day, Jane told John of her decision.22 When
John could not convince Jane to change her mind, he retained an
attorney to represent him regarding his parental rights.23 John also
repeatedly called RFS stating that his girlfriend was giving away his
baby and that he wanted to know his rights.
24

















Temporary Custody and Guardianship on August 13, 2002.2 5 Jane
appeared before the judge and consented to the termination of parental
rights and waiver of hearing. 26 Jane testified that John did not know
she was going forward with the adoption and that he opposed placing
the baby. 7 John did not receive notice of the hearing. 28 The judge
granted the petition and terminated John's parental rights because he
failed to register in Idaho's putative father registry.29  The jud e
granted RFS custody and appointed RFS guardian for the adoption.
RFS placed the baby with the Roes the same day.
3 1
Jane called John after the hearing to tell him she had given his
baby up for adoption.32 John responded by filing a separate paternity
action and moving to set aside the termination decree. 33 The judge
denied John's motion to set aside the termination decree and granted
the Roes custody.34
On appeal, the court reversed and remanded the case. 35 RFS then
filed a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court.36 While the appeal was
pending, the district court granted John custody of the child phased in
over a three-month period until John had full custody.37 When the
Roes requested that the district court judge stay the custody order and
consider evidence of the best interests of the child, the judge refused.38
The Roes appealed this decision and refused to comply with it on the
grounds that the order was stayed by their appeal. On appeal, the
Idaho Supreme Court held that John had been entitled to notice, set












37. Id. at 755.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 752.
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aside the adoption, and affirmed the award of custody to John.
40
II. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of these stories is that they
are not remarkable - they are repeated frequently in almost every state.
Cases involving litigation of adoption by unwed fathers are
increasingly becoming a staple of adoption practice. 41 In both of the
cautionary tales above, the adoptive placements were disrupted and the
children were eventually reunited with their biological fathers because
courts found that the parties failed to comply with provisions of state
42adoption law. In many more cases, the adoptive placement survives,
40. Id. at 755.
41. Not including cases arising under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1930 (2000), and cases arising in the context of state child welfare
and dependency proceedings, since 2000, over eighty cases around the country have
been reported involving litigation between unwed fathers and the adoptive parents.
When the ICWA and child welfare cases are included, the number of cases since 2000
rises to over 200. See e.g. S.C. W. v. C.B., 826 So. 2d 825, 827 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001);
In re Kyle F, 112 Cal. App. 4th 538, 541 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 2004); In re Alexander
M, 94 Cal. App. 4th 430, 434 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2001); In re Baby W, 796 N.E.2d
364, 368 (Ind. App. 2004); In re Baby Girl S., 29 P.3d 466, 467 (Kan. App. 2001); In
re McLarrin, 865 So. 2d 317, 319 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2004); Heidbreder v. Carton, 636
N.W.2d 833, 835 (Minn. App. 2002); In re Baby Girl P., 802 A.2d 1192, 1193 (N.H.
2002); In re Baby F., 2004 WL 771575 at *1 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. Apr. 13, 2004);
Arscott v. Bacon, 567 S.E.2d 898, 898-899 (S.C. App. 2002); In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d
360, 362 (Tenn. 2003); In re B.V., 33 P.3d 1083, 1084 (Utah App. 2001). Other
commentators, too, have recognized the strain on the adoption system of this increase
in litigation. See Karen C. Wehner, Student Author, Daddy Wants Rights Too: A
Perspective on Adoption Statutes, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 691, 713 (1994).
42. The failure to comply with state law is clearer in the case of Doe v. Roe Family
Services. There, the father's consent to the adoption was not obtained even though the
father and mother had together executed a "Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity."
Doe, 88 P.3d at 751. Under Idaho Law, the consent of a father executing such an
instrument is required. Id. at 754; Idaho Code § 16-1504(i) (1998) (requiring the
consent to an adoption of an unmarried biological father who has filed a voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity); § 16-1505(1)(a) (1998) (requiring that notice be
provided to any person whose consent is required under § 16-1505). In In re Williams,
the failure is not as clear but should nonetheless have been apparent to the parties. No.
CV 2004-77, Or. Vacating Or. Relating to Father's Parental Rights. There, the father
was not notified of the adoption although he complied with Idaho law which provided
for unwed fathers to file a notice of their intent to commence a paternity action. Id.;
Idaho Code § 16-1513(1) (1998). Idaho statutes conflict as to whether, in addition to
such a filing, an unwed father must actually initiate a paternity action to be entitled to
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but only after significant litigation and expense.. Moreover, the
reported cases are only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. In all
likelihood, many cases are resolved short of appeal. In yet others, the
disappointed father threatens litigation but lacks sufficient resources or
access to the legal system to pursue litigation. These cases run the
gamut. The cases range from situations in which the fathers' true
interest in parenting his child is fleeting and ephemeral, 43 to cases in
which he is serious about parenthood and capable of parenting.44 They
also include cases in which the father is pursuing the litigation in a
misguided attempt to further a relationship with the child's mother45 or
to continue an abusive relationship the mother.
46
This type of litigation between birth and adoptive parents is
unproductive and is harmful to children. One need only recall the vivid
pictures of Baby Jessica screaming as she was transferred from her
adoptive parents with whom she had lived for three years to her birth
parents whom she had never met, to understand that instability in the
placement of children for adoption can harm those children.47 Modem
notice. Compare Idaho Code § 16-1505(1)(b) with Idaho Code § 16-1504(2)(b); Idaho
Code § 16-1505(1). To the extent Idaho law requires a father to actually initiate a
paternity action, the law again conflicts regarding when such an action may be timely
initiated. The adoption consent provision permits a paternity action "filed pursuant to
this section" to be filed prior to the birth of the child. Idaho Code § 16-1504(9). Yet
the paternity statute only provides for filing an action only after the birth of the child.
Idaho Code § 7-1107 (1998).
43. See e.g. Doe v. Queen, 535 S.E.2d 658, 660 (S.C. App. 2000) (unwed father
waited three months after notification of child's birth and adoption to object to
adoption, failed to file an answer to complaint seeking termination of parental rights
until the day of the hearing, did not seek temporary custody and visitation, and did not
pay support for child).
44. See e.g. In re B. V., 33 P.3d at 1084-1085 (the father maintained contact
throughout the pregnancy, signed financial responsibility documents for pregnancy
costs, scored very high on psychological testing regarding parenting ability, and sought
full custody of child).
45. See e.g. Banach v. Cannon, 812 A.2d 435, 436 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 2002)
(where father sought to enjoin potential adoption action and an order disclosing birth
mother's whereabouts).
46. See e.g. In re Jonah C., 2002 WL 17336238 at *3 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. July 26,
2002).
47. The parting scene was covered in detail by the national popular press. CNN
News, "Jessi DeBoer Returned to Biological Parents Amid Furor" [ 1-5] (CNN Aug.
3, 1992) (TV broadcast, transcr. available in LEXIS, News Library, News All file);
Desda Moss, Child's Painful Parting: Jessica Handed to Birth Parents, USA Today
2005]
194 WHITTIER JOURNAL OF CHILD AND FAMILY ADVOCACY [Vol. 4:2
research on child development underscores this intuitive notion that the
disruption of attachments formed by infants and toddlers to their adult
caregivers can have serious and detrimental effects on their emotional
and psychological development.
48
3A (Aug. 3, 1993) (available at 1993 WL 6715348).
48. See generally John Bowlby, A Secure Base: Parent-Child Attachment and
Healthy Human Development 3-4 (Basic Books 1988); Susan B.G. Campbell & Paul
M. Taylor, Bonding and Attachment: Theoretical Issues, in Parent-Infant
Relationships 3 (Paul M. Taylor ed., Grune & Stratton 1980); Robert Karen, Becoming
Attached: First Relationships and How They Shape Our Capacity to Love (Oxford U.
Press 1994) (summarizing and synthesizing early research on attachment theory);
Eleanor Willemsen & Kristen Marcel, Attachment 101 for Attorneys: Implications for
Infant Placement Decisions, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 439 (1996). Attachment refers to
the relationship that forms early in life between a responsive caregiver and a dependent
infant that is necessary for a child's survival and appropriate development. Research
on child development indicates that when such attachments are disrupted during the
period in which they are forming or when children lose secure attached relationships,
their emotional, intellectual, and psychological development can be negatively
affected. While many factors can contribute to disruption of a child's developmental
needs and the interrelationship of such factors is unclear, the consensus of researchers
is that attachment and the disruption of attachment are crucial factors in intellectual,
emotional, and developmental problems experienced by such children.
A related argument rooted in the psycho-social literature has been made that the
mother has a special bond to the child that develops both the pre- and postnatal periods
which entitles her to play a special role in making decisions regarding the child's
welfare. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims
of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 394-402 (1991).
See also Diane E. Eyer, Mother-Infant Bonding: A Scientific Fiction 35-41 (Yale U..
Press 1992). My argument does not regard the bond formed by the mother, but rather
concerns the impact on the child of the loss of important relationships. Hill, who
disputes the biological and, to some extent, the emotional mother-to-infant bond,
concludes:
There is little doubt that the development of secure emotional ties between
parent and child has fundamental and long-lasting significance. It is
well-established that infants failing to form a bond with any adult are likely
to lack the ability to form deep and enduring relationships later in life. One
study found a strong correlation between insecurely attached infants and
those who experience a higher level of nonmaternal care in the first year of
life. Another study maintains that all infants who are placed for adoption
after nine months of age have difficulties with a variety of 'socioemotional'
matters, including establishing certain kinds of relationships with others.
Still other studies indicate that the quality of attachment in infancy may
affect the IQ of the child and the development of the child's sense of
self-identity, thereby affecting the child's ability to cope with various
environments including schools.
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In addition to the impact instability in adoption placement has on
the children involved, the litigation is difficult, expensive, time
consuming, and unpredictable. Often what seems legally appropriate is
not in the best interests of the child.49  Despite the possibility of
expedited appeals, the litigation surrounding these cases can drag on
for long periods of time. The Baby Jessica case wound through the
courts for almost three years.50  The Doe case, discussed in the
cautionary tale of the conflicted mother,51 was pending for nineteen
months before a final decision from Idaho's highest Court resolved the
issues in favor of the unwed father. 52 This extended litigation occurred
even though the Idaho Supreme Court had adopted an appellate rule
providing for expedited appeal of cases involving children in Idaho. 53
Hill at 402.
49. See e.g. In re Baby Girl M, 236 Cal. Rptr. 660, 661 (Cal. App. 4th Dist.1987)
(holding that although unwed father's constitutional rights were violated by failure to
provide adequate notice of the adoption, changing custody to the father would be
detrimental to the child).
50. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 509 U.S. 938, 938 (1993) (denying application for stay).
51. Supra Section I.B.
52. 88 P.3d at 749, 755.
53. Idaho Appellate Rule 12.1(a) provides for permissive, expedited appeal to the
Idaho Supreme Court whenever the best interests of a child would be served. In Doe,
the parties do not appear to have taken advantage of this provision. Many states
adopted provisions such as Idaho's as a partial response to the delay documented in
cases such as the Baby Jessica case. See Jessica K. Heldman, Student Author, Court
Delay and the Waiting Child, 40 San Diego L. Rev. 1001, 1015-1018 (2003); Jeanette
Mills, Student Author, Unwed Birthfathers and Infant Adoption: Balancing a Father's
Rights with the States Need for a Timely Surrender Process, 62 La. L. Rev. 615, 632
(2002) (discussing Louisiana's expedited adoption process). Such rules have not
ensured speedy resolution of cases even where they have been used. Heldman, supra,
at 1016-1019. For example, in a recent Idaho case involving custody by a gay father, a
permissive, expedited appeal was pursued (and permitted by the court). McGriff v.
McGriff, 99 P.3d 111, 114 (Idaho 2004). The custody trial was held in the spring of
2002. Corey Taule, Homosexual Dad Takes Custody Case to High Court: I.F. Judge's
Ruling May Send First Such Issue before Supremes, Idaho Falls Post Register Al [ 1]
(July 10, 2002) (available in Westlaw, KRT-POSTREG database). The request for
expedited permissive appeal was filed shortly thereafter. McGriff, 99 P.3d at 114. The
Court's opinion was delivered two and one-half years later. Id. at 111. During the
entire pendency of the appeal, the father's gay partner was residing in a mobile home
parked in the driveway of the father's home in order to avoid violating a visitation
restriction in the trial court's order. Taule, supra, at [ 7]. While the appeal was
pending, the case was continually covered in the local press drawing out the parents'
2005]
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The economic cost to the parties fighting these battles is huge.54 The
emotional cost to the adults in these battles cannot be underestimated.55
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the specter of such litigation is
likely to deter parties from considering adoption.
In this Article, I will propose that states reexamine the approach
they are taking to unmarried fathers in adoption, implement policies
designed to notify fathers, and quickly resolve litigation regarding the
placement of children for adoption while at the same time providing a
reliable mechanism for resolving conflicts. Such a policy would be
characterized by the following features: The central goals of all state
adoption law should be the accurate identification of children who are
truly "available" for adoption and the placement of children for
adoption in legally stable placements. This can only be accomplished
if states consistently notify birth fathers of adoption actions and swiftly
resolve their objections when they arise.
III. CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS
The sources of the growing crisis in adoption litigation are
complex. Certainly litigation has been spurred by a series of Supreme
Court cases that upset the legal framework for notice and consent to
adoption, but has failed to provide sufficient guidance on how to
constitutionally approach adoption notice and consent. 56 In addition to
creating confusion regarding the scope of an unwed father's
constitutional protection, the Court's opinions also leave open key
questions - in particular, under what circumstances may a court decline
to recognize unmarried father's relationship with a newborn child.
The Supreme Court jurisprudence does not, however, fully
explain the growing problem of adoption litigation. Rather, the
confusion left by the Supreme Court has been aggravated by a
disconnect between an idealized legislative framework implemented in
public conflict, to the probable detriment of the children.
54. Although statistics are not generally available, one birth father reported that the
adoptive parents in his case testified that they had incurred over $100,000 in legal fees.
Erik L. Smith, What Birth Fathers Don't Know Hurts Everyone [ 14],'http://www.e-
magazine.adoptioncom/articles/438/what-birth-fathers-dont-know-hurts-everyone/artic
le/6358/2.html (last accessed Mar. 29, 2005).
55. Robby DeBoer, the adoptive mother of Baby Jessica, detailed her intense
emotional experience in a book. Robby De Boer, Losing Jessica (Doubleday 1994).
56. See infra Section III.A (discussing the Supreme Court jurisprudence).
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many states, and the goals and desires of fathers regarding their
children. Even after the Supreme Court upset prior approaches to
adoption notice, states have retained a more traditional view that
assumes unwed fathers are not important parties in an adoption
proceeding. This approach is inconsistent with the changing norms
of paternal behaviors and expectations regarding children born outside
marriage. 58 The combination of this uncertain legal framework, state
attempts to continue dispensing with the consent of unmarried fathers,
and the growing expectation by fathers that they will parent their
children, has resulted in escalating litigation.
A. U.S. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON UNWED FATHERS
In a series of cases beginning with Stanley v. Illinois59 through
Lehr v. Robertson60 and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 6 1 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the interests of unwed fathers regarding their
children. In 1972, when the first case in this line of authority was
decided, the laws of most states summarily dispensed with notice to
and consent of unmarried fathers in parental termination/adoption
cases. 62  This approach was consistent with the development of
adoption as a solution to the birth of children outside marriage.
63
57. See infra Section III.C (discussing state legislative attempts to preserving a
more traditional approach to adoption).
58. See infra Section III.B (discussing changing norms of parenting).
59. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
60. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
61. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
62. See Homer Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 20.2,
855 (2d ed., West Group 1988) (citing Note, The Emerging Constitutional Protection
of the Putative Father's Parental Rights, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1581 (1972)) ("Until 1972
the statutes in the various states generally provided that the consent of the mother of an
illegitimate child would alone be sufficient to make the child available for adoption
and, as a logical consequence, that the involuntary termination of her parental rights
would have the same effect. In other words the father of the illegitimate child had,
under these statutes, no legally enforceable right to assert his parental rights in the child
if the mother wished to place the child for adoption or if she failed in her parental
duties sufficiently to warrant terminating her parental rights."). See also John R.
Hamilton, The Unwed Father and the Right to Know of His Child's Existence, 76 Ky.
L.J. 949, 949-951 (1988).
63. Often histories of adoption in the United States characterized adoption as a
child-centered process intended to provide children with a safe and loving home when
their birth parents could not care for them. See e.g. Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption
2005]
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Adoption decisions were made to avoid the stigma of out-of-wedlock
births under the cloak of secrecy. 64 Even the consent of the mother,
while required, was (and is) often the product of general or specific
coercion. 5  Many factors contributed to changing norms regarding
adoption. Increased sexual freedom has led to more births outside
marriage. That fact and rising divorce rates helped lessen the stigma
of non-marital births and single-parent homes. 67 Adoptions - both the
Practice, Issues, and Laws: 1958-1983, 17 Fam. L.Q. 173, 176-177 (1983); Sanford
N. Katz, Rewriting the Adoption Story, 5 Fain. Advoc. 9, 9 (1998). While certainly
adoption had that effect, some of the more common reasons birth parents could not
care for their children were that they were single mothers of illegitimate children who
would not be able to support themselves economically or to overcome the stigma to
themselves or their children of an out of wedlock birth. Judith Dulberger, Mother
Donitfore the Best (Syracuse U. Press 1996) (discussing the separation of poor women
from their children in nineteenth century orphanages and asylums because of the
inability of birth mothers to provide stable homes for their children); Carol Sanger,
Separating from Children, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 375, 445-450 (1996) (discussing the
stigma of illegitimacy on mothers and children during the middle twentieth century and
other cultural conceptions of motherhood and adoption).
64. D. Marianne Brower Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil: A Blueprint for
Legislative Reform of the Disclosure of Health-Related Information in Adoption, 70
N.C. L. Rev. 681, 695-698 (1992) (discussing the reasons for the secrecy surrounding
most adoption orders).
65. See e.g. In re Perry, 641 P.2d 178, 181 (Wash. App. Div. 3 1982) (mother was
pressured by adoption agency to place child for adoption); In re Baby Boy L., 144
A.D.2d 674, 676 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1988) (mother's family threatened to throw
her out of her home if she did not place baby for adoption); see also Mindy Schulman
Roman, Student Author, Rethinking Revocation: Adoption from a New Perspective, 23
Hofstra L. Rev. 733, 755-757 (1995) (discussing cases decided in favor of the
biological parents as a result of coercive acts by the adoptive parents, their agents, or
other persons).
66. See Jane Mauldon, Family Change and Welfare Reform, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev.
325, 326-328 (1996) (discussing the root causes of the increase in the numbers of
children born to unmarried parents). The proportion of children born to unmarried
parents has risen sharply from eleven percent in 1970 to approximately thirty percent in
1991. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S.: 1994 80, tbl. 100
(114th ed., 1994) (available at
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1994-02.pdf).
67. While concerns about single-parent families are continually expressed, such
families have become much more common and are not subject to the kind of isolation
that might have victimized them. See generally e.g. Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral
Complexities of Family Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 225 (1997) (critiquing previous
frameworks of morality in relation to single-parent families and supporting trends
which recognize the complexities and benefits of single-parent families).
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mother's decision to place a child for adoption and the fact that a child
was an adopted child - became increasingly public. 68 With increasing
public acceptance of adoption, the secrecy surrounding adoption
waned. Legislatures strengthened the law ensuring the finality of the
mother's adoption decision.6 9 It should not be surprising that by 1972,
increasing awareness of the interests of unmarried fathers had also
gained attention and led to a number of cases across the country
culminating in the decision in Stanley.70 The problem of unmarried
fathers in adoption has proved more intractable than other changes in
adoption. While the Supreme Court's jurisprudence swept the old
system away, it has brought little additional clarity to the role of
fathers' consent in adoption.
In Stanley, the unwed father and mother had three children and
lived together for approximately eighteen years.71 When the mother
died suddenly, the State of Illinois initiated a dependency proceeding,
took custody of the children as wards of the State, and declined to give
Stanley an opportunity to be heard, finding that it could ignore his
relationship with his children because he was not married to their
mother.72 The State statutory scheme presumed that "an unwed father
is not a 'parent' whose existing relationship with his children must be
considered.,
73
68. See E. Wayne Carp, Family Matters: Secrecy and Disclosure in the History of
Adoption 43-44 (Harv. U. Press 1998); Katarina Wegar, Adoption, Identity, and
Kinship: The Debate over Sealed Birth Records 18-21 (Yale U. Press 1997).
69. Ira Mark Ellman et al., Family Law: Cases, Text, Problems 1249 (4th ed., Lexis
Nexis 2004) ("In recent years, the trend has been toward making consent irrevocable in
a shorter period of time, and limiting the birth parent's opportunity to change her
mind."). The Uniform Adoption Act, for example, requires parents to revoke their
consent to the adoption within eight days of the child's birth. Unif. Adoption Act of
1994 § 2-404(a) (1994).
70. See Clark, supra n. 62, at § 20.2, 855-856.
71. 405 U.S. at 646.
72. Id. at 646-647.
73. Id. at 650. See Ellman et al., supra n. 69, at 981 ("Not so long ago, the law
hardly considered the possibility that an unmarried father might seek to assert paternity
rather than escape it, and procedures for such actions were often not available. This
began to change with the decision in Stanley v. Illinois .. "). Others saw the case as
confirming a view of fathers that recognized their familial relationships as voluntary
and created only with reference to the social relationship they formed and their
economic role in the family. See e.g. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The
Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1415, 1422 (1991) ("In situations
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The Supreme Court rejected the implicit state presumption that all
unwed fathers were unfit. 74 Rather, the Court held that a state cannot
terminate the parental rights of an unwed father who has established a
relationship with his children without first conducting a hearing to
determine whether the father is unfit.75 The Court was not persuaded
by the State's argument that its presumption against unwed fathers
facilitated efficient handling of adoption, concluding:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure
forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when
it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past
formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the
important interests of both parent and child.
76
On its face, the decision in Stanley seems clear enough - states
may not summarily dispense with an unmarried father's consent to
adoption through use of a conclusive presumption of unfitness.
77
Nonetheless, the decision left many questions unanswered. Most
importantly, the question of what process an unwed father was due was
not answered by the decision. Moreover, the Stanley decision left open
the question of whether all fathers were entitled to the same process in
actions terminating their parental rights or whether only fathers who
had established a parental relationship were entitled to protection. 78 In
involving unwed fathers, the Supreme Court has not decided cases consistently with its
rhetoric: only those fathers who had shared a home with the child have been found to
have cognizable due process interests in the parent-child relationship."); Janet L.
Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions about Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 637,
649 (1993) ("Yet, underlying all five cases and explicit in the most recent Supreme
Court case, is the suggestion that legal paternity depends on the father's development
of a relationship, not with his children, but with their mother.").
74. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 656-657.
77. Stanley remains an enigmatic decision. On the one hand, commentators have
haled the decision as the watershed decision recognizing the rights of fathers vis-A-vis
their children. See Hamilton, supra n. 62, at 950-951.
78. The confusion left by the decision in Stanley can be seen in the different state
responses to the case. See Clark, supra n. 62, at §20.2, 857. At the time it decided
Stanley, the Supreme Court remanded a case involving an unwed father with no
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the late 1970s, the Supreme Court accepted review in two stepparent
adoption cases, Quilloin v. Wolcott7 9 and Caban v. Mohammed,8° that
raised issues created in the wake of Stanley.
In Quilloin, when the biological father of the child was notified of
the stepfather's action to adopt the child, he objected, responding to the
adoption action by filing a legitimization petition, an objection to the
adoption, and a formal request for visitation.81 During the eleven years
between the child's birth and the adoption action, the father, Quilloin,
had sporadic contact with his child. 82 He appears to have visited the
child informally and occasionally gave the child gifts.83 But Quilloin
never established any formal visitation with the child and he did not
pay child support regularly. 84  Only after the stepfather began
proceedings to adopt the child did the birth father make any formal
attempt to assert his parental rights.85 In response to the father's
objection, the Georgia trial court conducted a hearing on the father's
legitimization petition at which the father had the opportunity to
present relevant evidence. 86 After the hearing, the court rejected the
father's claims finding that the adoption was in the "best interests of
the child."'87  Quilloin appealed, arguing that the statute violated his
substantive due process right to maintain a relationship with his child
when it terminated his parental rights based on the best interests of the
child standard.
88
established relationship with his child for further consideration in light of its decision
in Stanley. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of Wis. & Upper Mich., 178
N.W.2d 56 (Wis. 1970), vacated sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of Wis. &
Upper Mich., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972). Clark points out that its handling of this case
suggests that the Court thought its holding in Stanley applied to all unwed fathers.
Clark, supra n. 62, at § 20.2, 856 n. 11.
79. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
80. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
81. 434 U.S. at 250.
82. Id. at 249, 251.
83. Id. at 251.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 250.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 251.
88. Id. at 252. Quilloin argued that, under Stanley, he was entitled to an "absolute
veto" of the adoption absent a finding of unfitness. Id. at 253. Quilloin also argued
that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause because it treated unmarried
fathers less deferentially than unmarried mothers. Id. The court rejected defendant's
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Despite the fact that Georgia law at the time closely resembled
the Illinois statutory scheme declared unconstitutional in Stanley,89 the
Court unanimously upheld the adoption in Quilloin.9° The facts in
Quilloin differed from Stanley in several important respects. In
contrast to the facts in Stanley, the unmarried father in Quilloin had
never lived together with his child and the child's mother in a family
relationship. 91 Moreover, in Quilloin, the father was notified of the
adoption action and given an opportunity to be heard. 92 His parental
rights were terminated not based on a conclusive presumption, but
rather after a hearing andjudicial finding that termination was in the
best interests of the child. The Court rejected the father's argument
that his parental rights could only be terminated based on a finding of
unfitness holding that, under the facts presented, the State's use of the
best interest of the child standard was constitutional.94 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court discounted the social relationship between
Quilloin and his child,95 treating it as virtually irrelevant because he
had not lived with the child and the child's mother in a family unit.
96
In fact, the Court accorded protected status to the family unit formed
between the mother, stepfather, and child.
97
equal protection claim. Id. at 256 (Stewart, J., concurring).
89. Georgia law, still reflecting the typical pre-Stanley approach to adoption,
provided that an unmarried father's child could be adopted without his consent if the
court found the adoption to be in the child's best interests. Id. at 248 (majority). The
same statute allowed other categories of parents - married fathers and mothers - to
veto adoption of their children unless the vetoing parent was found to be unfit or had
abandoned the child. Id. at 248 n. 2.
90. Id at 246, 256.
91. Id. at 253. "But this is not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or
sought, actual or legal custody of his child." Id. at 255 (Stewart, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 250 n. 7 (majority).
93. Id. at251.
94. Id. at 254.
95. Id. at 255-256 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[Quilloin] has never shouldered any
significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or
care of the child... [and] he does not even now seek custody of his child.").
96. Id. at 255.
97. Id. ("But this is not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or sought,
actual or legal custody of his child. Nor is this a case in which the proposed adoption
would place the child with a new set of parents with whom the child had never before
lived. Rather, the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a
family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except appellant.").
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Quilloin answered one of the open questions left by Stanley.
Clearly, not all unwed fathers were entitled to the same process in
adoption and parental termination cases. While an unwed father's
rights may not be dispensed through use of a conclusive presumption,
if that father has not had legal custody of his child or lived with the
child in a "family unit,"98 a state may terminate his parental rights
based on the relatively low standard of the best interests of the child. 99
In Caban, the father had a substantial, although sometimes
indirect, relationship with his children. He had lived with them and
their mother as a family unit for the first several years of the children's
lives. 100  After the mother and the father separated, the children
eventually moved to Puerto Rico with their maternal grandmother.
10 1
Caban never formally established his paternity. 102 After a period of
98. Dolgin, supra n. 73, at 650 (arguing that "the cases... [regarding] an unwed
biological father's [parental rights] ... make sense only if the apparently sufficient
requirement for effecting legal paternity - that a father effect a social relationship with
his biological child - is read as code for the requirement that he effect that relationship
within the context of family") (emphasis added); Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathers
and Adoption:. A Theoretical Analysis in Context, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 967, 973 (1994)
(noting that "biology alone did not entitle an unwed father to rights coequal with those
of mothers or married fathers. Nor, apparently, did the existence of a social
relationship between the father and child .... More likely, as Janet Dolgin argues, the
Court was troubled by Quilloin's failure to form a 'family unit' with the mother and
child.").
99. In cases dealing with the constitutionality of state interventions in the decision
making of intact families, the Court has held that the best interests of the child test does
not sufficiently protect the parents' rights. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69-70
(2000):
The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court [the best interests
of the child test] directly contravened the traditional presumption that a fit
parent will act in the best interest of his or her child. In that respect, the
court's presumption failed to provide any protection for [the mother's]
fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of
her own daughters.
100. Caban, 441 U.S. at 382.
101. Id. at 383 (Caban went to Puerto Rico and, with the understanding that he would
return the children in a few days, the grandmother allowed Caban to take the children.
But, Caban brought the children back to New York with him. Their mother brought an
action for custody and obtained an order giving her custody and the father visitation.).
102. Id. at 393 (Caban had admitted paternity, but it appears that no formal court
order established his paternity.).
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time in which the mother and father wrangled over the children in
custody litigation, the mother and her new husband filed a petition to
adopt the children and Caban and his new wife filed a cross-petition for
adoption. 103  The mother's adoption petition was granted after a
hearing at which Caban appeared and opposed the adoption.
10 4
The New York statutory scheme was very similar to the Georgia
statute at issue in Quilloin. The New York statutory scheme provided
that an unmarried father's parental rights could be terminated and his
child placed for adoption without his consent unless the adoption was
not in the best interests of the child. 
105
The father appealed the adoption on equal protection grounds.
10 6
He argued that the New York statute impermissibly treated unmarried
mothers and fathers differently. 107 The Court concluded that the New
York statute was an impermissible gender classification that was not
sufficiently related to an important state interest. 10 8 Because Caban
was decided on equal protection grounds, the fact of Caban's
relationship with his children was not directly at issue. Nonetheless,
the Court made clear the central importance of Caban's familial
relationship with his children and the fact that a family unit had been
103. Id. at 383. Under New York law at the time, the mother of an illegitimate child
and her husband could together file a petition to adopt the child. Id. at 383 n. 1.
104. Id. at 384.
105. Id. at 385-387 (stating that "[t]he unwed father has no similar control over the
fate of his child, even when his parental relationship is substantial - as in this case. He
may prevent the termination of his parental rights only by showing that the best
interests of the child would not permit the child's adoption by the petitioning couple.").
Id at 387. The New York statute at issue in Caban had been the subject of an earlier
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court in In re Malpica-Orsini, 331 N.E.2d 486 (N.Y.
1975), appeal dismissed sub nom. Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976). Although the
facts of the prior case were virtually identical to those of Caban, it was dismissed for
want of an important federal question. Orsini, 423 U.S. at 1042.
106. Caban, 441 U.S. at 385.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 394 (concluding that "Section 111 both excludes some loving fathers from
full participation in the decision whether their children will be adopted and, at the same
time, enables some alienated mothers arbitrarily to cut off the paternal rights of fathers.
We conclude that this undifferentiated distinction between unwed mothers and unwed
fathers, applicable in all circumstances where adoption of a child of theirs is at issue,
does not bear a substantial relationship to the State's asserted interests." (citations
omitted)).
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established. 109 It rejected the reasoning of the State of New York "that
'a natural mother, absent special circumstances, bears a closer
relationship with her child ... than a father does.' "110 Rather, the
Court reasoned that "the present case demonstrates that an unwed
father may have a relationship with his children fully comparable to
that of the mother."
111
The Court distinguished Quilloin on the grounds that the father in
Caban had lived together with his children and their mother as a
"natural family '"11 2 and had "participated in the care and support" of
the children. I13
When Stanley, Caban, and Quilloin are read together, the Court's
focus on the family unit as the defining prerequisite for a father's rights
is underscored. The parental relationships of Stanley and Caban, both
of whom lived together with the children and their mother in family
units, were entitled to protection, whereas the social relationship of
Quilloin with his child was not protected. 1
4
109. Id. at 389.
110. Id. at 388 (deletion in original).
111. Id. at389.
112. Id. Janet Dolgin argues that by "natural family" the Court meant not only that
the mother and father cohabited, but also that they did so in a relationship that was like
a marriage. Dolgin, supra n. 73, at 658-659.
113. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 ("In rejecting an unmarried father's constitutional claim
in Quilloin,... we emphasized the importance of the appellant's failure to act as a
father toward his children, noting that he " 'has never exercised actual or legal custody
over his child, and thus has never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect
to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child. Appellant does not
complain of his exemption from these responsibilities and, indeed, he does not even
now seek custody of his child.' "). Id. at 389 n. 7. "In Quilloin .. we noted the
importance in cases of this kind of the relationship that in fact exists between the parent
and child." Id. at 393 n. 14.
114. Janet Dolgin reached the same conclusion that the father's participation in a
"family unit" as opposed to the father's social relationship with the child is the defining
pre-requisite for recognition of the father-child relationship. Dolgin, supra n. 73, at
657-658.
Commentators analyzing Caban have noted the Court's acknowledgment that
an unwed father may have a 'relationship with his children fully comparable
to that of the mother,' but have frequently failed to recognize the extent to
which the Caban Court, in fact, premised the recognition of the father-child
relationship on the unwed father's having set up a 'natural family' with the
children and their mother.
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Three years after Caban, the Court accepted review in Lehr v.
Robertson. Like Quilloin and Caban, the adoption petition in Lehr was
filed by the child's stepfather. 115 Lehr, the unmarried father, lived with
the child's mother prior to her birth and visited her in the hospital.' 16
After the mother's discharge from the hospital, however, "she
concealed her whereabouts from [Lehr]" and he was only sporadically
able to locate her and visit the child over the course of the next two
years. 117 In December 1978, the mother's new husband filed a petition
seeking to adopt the child.1 18 Notice of this proceeding was not given
to Lehr. 1 9 One month after the adoption petition was filed, Lehr filed
an action seeking a determination of paternity and seeking visitation
with the child. 120  Shortly after the paternity action was filed and
without notice to the father, the New York Court entered an order of
adoption. 
121
Although the Supreme Court upheld the adoption, it reasoned that
even a father with no established relationship with his child has a
liberty interest protected by the Constitution:
The significance of the biological connection [between father and
child] is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no
other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring.
If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of
responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of
the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable
contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the
Id.
Compare Forman, supra n. 98, at 974 ("The language of Caban strongly suggests that
the existence of a social father-child relationship is crucial to recognizing an unwed
father's equal right to veto an adoption. However, the prior existence of a family unit
composed of Caban, the children, and the children's mother undoubtedly influenced
the Court as well.").
115. 463 U.S. at 250.
116. Id. at 252.
117. Id. at 269 (White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
118. Id. at250.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 252.
121. Id. at 250.
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Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a state to listen
to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie. 
122
The Court acknowledged that its earlier decisions had established
the proposition that fathers who have established relationships with
their children are entitled to more constitutional protection than fathers
who have not yet established their relationships with their children. 
123
The Court also reasoned that "the mere existence of a biological link
does not merit" the same constitutional protection as had been
previously afforded established relationships. 124  It concluded,
nonetheless, that even unwed fathers who had never established a
relationship with their children could not be completely foreclosed
from decision making regarding their child under all circumstances.
125
Biological fathers, according to Lehr, have an "opportunity interest"
that no other man has to establish a relationship with their children.
126
Based on its recognition that unwed fathers have a constitutionally
protected interest in establishing a relationship with their children, the
Court framed the question in Lehr as "whether New York has
adequately protected [the unwed father's] opportunity to form [a
parent-child] relationship."' 12 7  Thus, the Court imposed the
constitutional burden on states to provide a process in which the unwed
father could act independently of the mother to protect his interest in
forming a relationship with the child.
128
The Court's reasoning is enigmatic. On the one hand, it seems to
extend its prior recognition that the Constitution protects established
father-child relationships. At the same time, it upholds an adoption
where the father received no notice and did not participate in any
way,129 despite the fact that he had diligently and continuously sought
122. Id. at 262.
123. Id. at 259-260.
124. Id. at 261.
125. Id. at 267.
126. Id. at 262.
127. Id. at 262-263.
128. id. at 263.
129. Id. at 253. The court entering the adoption order was aware of Lehr's pending
paternity action. The fathers in Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban had all been notified of
the adoption proceedings involving their children. See supra nn. 71, 80, 102 and
accompanying text.
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to establish a relationship with his child.130 On the latter score, it
appears that the only reason Lehr had not established a relationship
with his child was because of the mother's interference. 
131
The New York statutory scheme in effect at the time of the Lehr
decision provided for a putative father registry in which an unwed
father interested in asserting parental rights could file notice of his
interest by mailing an index card to the registry. 13 2  Access to the
registry was completely within the control of the putative father. Lehr
had not filed in the putative father registry at any time during the two
years he sought to locate his child. The existence of the registry,
which the majority viewed as simple and clear-cut, was crucial to the
Court's decision upholding the New York statute. 134 In describing the
New York statutory scheme, the Court noted that it was arrived at as
the result of a legislative commission that was charged with
accommodating the rights of unwed fathers and the competing interests
of a prompt, efficient, and reliable adoption system. 135 The fact that
New York had such a straightforward and simple procedure, in which
compliance was totally within the control of the unwed father, was the
primary basis upon which the Court upheld the New York statute.
136
Although it upheld the New York statute, the Court cautioned that "[i]f
130. In his dissent, Justice White observed, "Lehr never ceased his efforts to locate
Lorraine and Jessica." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 (White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 263-264 (majority).
133. Id. at 251.
134. Id. at 263-264.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 265. Putative father registries have received mixed evaluations from the
commentators. Compare Shirley D. Howell, The Putative Father Registry: Behold
Now the Behemoth (A Cautionary Tale), 64 Ala. Law. 237, 238 (2003) (criticizing
Alabama's registry which imposes a thirty day statute of limitations on the assertion of
parental rights by unwed fathers) with Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father
Registry Database, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 1031, 1038 (2002) (arguing that
nationalizing putative father registries will help make them more effective). While
registries have significant limitations, they can contribute to the stability of adoptions
by providing a mechanism for interested fathers to alert prospective adoptive parents of
their interest in parenting their child. See Laurence Nolan, Preventing Fatherlessness
through Adoption while Protecting the Parental Rights of Unwed Fathers: How
Effective Are Paternity Registries?, 4 Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. __
(forthcoming 2005) (copy on file with the Whittier J. of Child & Fam. Advoc.).
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this scheme [referring to the New York putative father provisions] were
likely to omit many responsible fathers, and if qualification for notice
were beyond the control of an interested putative father, it might be
thought procedurally inadequate."
' 137
The Court's decision in Lehr is a significant departure from its
reasoning in Stanley, Caban, and Quilloin. Although the Court upheld
the adoption in Lehr, it based its reasoning on the father's procedural
default under the New York statutory scheme. In doing so, the Court
did not distinguish between nonresidential relationships in which the
father visits the child and provides financial support for the child and
relationships in which the father, mother, and child reside together in a
family unit.13 8 It also appeared ready to hold that a man, who had not
established a relationship with his child or lived with the child and
mother as a family unit, still might be able to object to the termination
of his parental rights and/or adoption of the child through a process
such as putative father registration. The apparent willingness of the
majority in Lehr to recognize father-child relationships that arise from
less substantial contexts than a "family unit" is curious in light of facts
not raised in the majority opinion. In his dissent, Justice White points
out that Lehr made substantial efforts to contact and visit his child over
the objection of the mother who threatened to have him arrested if he
attempted to visit the child. 139 After Lehr, it is not clear what kind of
father-child relationship will be entitled to recognition. Certainly, the
Court did not disavow its prior reasoning that father-child relationships
arising in a family unit with the mother and children are entitled to
recognition. But, the Court's equivocal focus on less formal or
substantial relationships opens the possibility that at least some father-
child relationships outside family units may be entitled to recognition.
Nor is it clear how much of an opportunity states must provide a father
137. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263-264.
138. Id. at 262-263 (discussing the necessary qualities of a father-child relationship
that might be subject to protection, the Court used language such as "accept[ing] some
measure of responsibility for the child's future," "enjoy[ing] the blessings of the
parent-child relationship," "mak[ing] uniquely valuable contributions to the child's
development," and maintaining a "significant custodial, personal, or financial
relationship" with the child) (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 269 (White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) ("During this time
Lehr never ceased his efforts to locate Lorraine and Jessica and achieved sporadic
success until August, 1977. ... Lorraine threatened Lehr with arrest unless he stayed
away and refused to permit him to see Jessica.").
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to establish such a relationship over the objection of the mother. Must
the father act prior to the birth of the child? May a state establish a
time frame after which a father's rights are cut off?
The central unresolved question left by the Lehr is whether and
under what circumstances must states recognize the father-child
relationship when the child is an infant. Lehr certainly comes closest
to resolving the newborn issue. Certainly, it stands for the proposition
that a state may rely on an appropriate registry process to terminate the
parental rights of unwed fathers. However, the child in Lehr was a
two-year-old by the time the litigation commenced. 140 Although the
father diligently sought to establish his relationship with his daughter
and was consistently thwarted by the mother, he also missed
opportunities to do so. He could have filed a paternity action much
sooner when it became clear that the mother would not recognize his
parental interests. He could have registered in New York's putative
father registry. Regardless of what one thinks of the result in the case,
it simply does not address the issues raised when a child is placed for
adoption with third parties (who are not married to or related to the
biological parents) at the moment of birth. Both of the cautionary tales
described in this Article deal with the adoption at birth issue. Many of
the most notorious cases also deal with the adoption-at-birth scenario.
The adoption-at-birth situation raises significantly different issues
than those raised in the stepparent or older child adoption cases. In the
latter situation, it is at least plausible to expect an unwed father who
seeks to veto an adoption to have taken some steps, whether formal or
informal, to establish a relationship with his child. In the adoption-at-
birth scenario, however, it is not reasonable to impose such
requirements. In many states, it is impossible for an unwed father to
initiate a paternity action prior to the birth of the child. He may not
know the mother is pregnant or may believe that she has terminated the
pregnancy. If she resists his attempts to remain in communication, the
father may be the subject of anti-harassment orders precluding
communication.
The most recent foray of the Supreme Court into the question of
unwed fathers' rights was decided in 1989.141 In Michael H., the
unwed father, Michael, had a child, Victoria, with Carole, a married
140. Id. at 249-250.
141. MichaelH., 491 U.S. 110.
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woman.142 During the first three years of Victoria's life, she and Carol
lived variously with Gerald (Carole's husband), Michael, and a third
man, Scott. 14  Although Gerald was listed as Victoria's father on her
birth certificate and held himself out throughout this time as Victoria's
father, Carole, Michael, and Victoria obtained paternity tests
establishing that Michael was Victoria's biological father.1" When
Michael's relationship with Carole deteriorated, she refused to permit
Michael to visit Victoria. 145  Michael filed a filiation action in
California seeking to establish paternity and obtain visitation with
Victoria. 146 During the pendency of this action, Carole and Michael
reconciled and lived together with Victoria for a number of months. 147
In the end, however, the relationship did not last and Carole returned to
her husband, Gerald. 148
At the time, California law provided that " 'the issue of a wife
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.' ",149 This
presumption could only be rebutted by the husband or the wife.
150
Thus the court, based on affidavits indicating that Gerald and Carole
were cohabiting at the time of Victoria's conception and birth,
dismissed Michael's action and refused to order visitation. 
15 1
Challenging the constitutionality of the California statute,
Michael argued that the conclusive presumption precluding him from
establishing his paternity violated his liberty interest in establishing a
relationship with his child pursuant to Stanley.152  The majority
rejected Michael's argument, reasoning that Stanley, Quilloin, Caban,
and Lehr did not recognize a liberty interest in biological fatherhood,
but rather recognized an interest in fatherhood that develops "within
142. Id. at 113.





148. Id. at 115.
149. Id. (quoting Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 621(a) (West 1995) (repealed 1992)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 123.
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the unitary family." 15 3  Once the case law was re-characterized this
way, the majority concluded that Michael did not have a
constitutionally protected interest. 154 Rather, the Court reasoned that
the law has traditionally protected family units such as that between
Carole, Gerald, and Victoria, from the interference by individuals such
as Michael.
15 5
The reasoning of the Michael H. Court was foreshadowed in
Quilloin, where the Court also protected the mother's new marital
family unit at the expense of recognizing the father-child
relationship. 156 It also carried forward the Court's reasoning in Lehr
that potential relationships are not entitled to recognition merely based
on biology. 15 7 The Court's reasoning is also consistent with its focus
in both Stanley and Caban on the development of the father-child
relationship within an existing family unit. 15 8  But the decision in
Michael H. seems inconsistent with the decision in Lehr, where the
Court seemed willing to give recognition to father-child relationships
arising outside family units.1 59  It also seems inconsistent with the
emphasis in Stanley, Caban, and Quilloin on the protection of
153. Id
154. Id. at 124.
155. Id
Thus the legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the relationship
between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria has been treated as
a protected family unit under the historic practices of our society, or whether
on any other basis it has been accorded special protection. We think it
impossible to find that it has. In fact, quite to the contrary, our traditions
have protected the marital family (Gerald, Carole, and the child they
acknowledge to be theirs) against the sort of claim Michael asserts.
Id.
156. 434 U.S. at 550.
157. See generally id.
158. The Lehr Court pointed out that "this Court has held that the Federal
Constitution supersedes state law and provides even greater protection for certain
formal family relationships. [T]he rights of the parents are a counterpart of the
responsibilities they have assumed." 463 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added). The Court
concluded that "[t]he difference between the developed parent-child relationship that
was implicated in Stanley and Caban, and the potential relationship involved in
Quilloin and this case, is both clear and significant." Id. at 261.
159. Id. at 267.
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established relationships. Despite Carole and Gerald's marriage,
Gerald had only resided in a family unit with Carole and Victoria for
short periods of time. 16  Moreover, the family unit in existence at the
time the case was filed was comprised of Carole, Michael, and
Victoria. 161
The web of these cases often appears to be impenetrable. Upon
reflection, however, several propositions arise from them:
1. Where the mother of a child is married, states may decline to
recognize the interests of an unmarried biological father even where
that person has established a substantial relationship of long duration
with the child;
2. Where the mother of the child is unmarried, and the mother,
father, and child lived together in a family unit, states may not
summarily dispose of the interests of the father. Moreover, the best
interest of the child test is not a sufficiently respectful basis upon which
to terminate the rights of a father who has resided in a family unit with
the mother and child;
3. Where the mother is unmarried and the father has never resided
in a family unit with the mother and child, states must establish a
procedural framework, such as a putative father registry, that permits a
father to assert his interest in parenting his child unilaterally and
independently of the mother;
4. Where the mother is unmarried and the father has never resided
in a family unit with the mother and child, and where the state does not
have a putative father registry or similar statutory framework, the
procedural protections due the father are unclear. It may be, based on
Quilloin, that notice of an adoption and/or parental termination is
required, but that parental rights may be terminated based on the best
interests of the child.
160. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114-115.
161. Id. at 143-144 (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). Not only did
Michael and Carole live together in a family unit in the same household, but Michael
supported Victoria financially. Victoria called Michael, "Daddy." Id.
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B. MEN'S AND WOMEN'S ROLES AND CHANGING NORMS OF
PARENTING
The Court's decisions in the Stanley line of authority coincide
with (and possibly reflect) a more engaged norm of parenting by men.
Fathers have been steadily becoming more involved in parenting their
children. 162  Increasing involvement in parenting has created
heightened expectations by men that they will be engaged parents, and
that their parenting will be uniquely important to their children.
163
Involvement has also caused men to increasingly value their roles as
parents. 164
Social science research on parenting documents a heightened
level of parental engagement with children. One important long-range
study of parenting reached the following conclusions:
1. Most fathers who live with their children participate regularly
in some kind of leisure or play activity with them. While mothers are
more likely to do 'quiet' activities (reading a book or doing a puzzle,
for example), fathers are more likely to play an outdoor game or sports
activity. Very high levels of both fathers and mothers report talking at
least once a week with their children about their family.
2. Substantial percentages of fathers who live with their children
are engaged in monitoring their children's daily activities and in setting
limits on those activities. For example, 61 percent set limits on what
television programs their children are allowed to watch.
3. More than one in five young children in two-parent families
have their father as the primary caregiver when the mother is at work,
attending school, or looking for work.
4. While 40 percent of children whose fathers live outside the
home have no contact with them, the other 60 percent had contact an
average of 69 days in the last year.
165
162. Kathleen Gerson, No Man's Land: Men's Changing Commitments to Family
and Work 8 (BasicBooks 1993); Robert L. Griswold, Fatherhood in America: A
History 269 (BasicBooks 1993).
163. Gerson, supra n. 162, at 8; Griswold, supra n. 162, at 269.
164. Gerson, supra n. 162, at 8; Griswold, supra n. 162, at 269; but see Miranda
Kaye & Julia Tolmie, Discoursing Dads: The Rhetorical Devices of Fathers' Rights
Groups, 22 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 162, 190-193 (1998).
165. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Child Trends: Charting Parenthood.
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Men are more likely to seek significant custodial contact with
their children upon family breakdown. 66 Popular culture has focused
more on active and engaged fathers 16 7 and has vilified men who are
A Statistical Portrait of Fathers and Mothers in America, Executive Summary [ 3],
http://www.fatherhood.hhs.gov/charting02/executive.htm (last accessed Mar. 30,
2005).
166. Most of the statistical research regarding gender preferences in custody
litigation is becoming quite dated and is very inconsistent. In a major study published
in 1992, Eleanor Maccoby and Robert Mnookin concluded that women got sole
custody in approximately seventy percent of the cases. Eleanor E. Maccoby & Robert
H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody 104, 112
(Harv. U. Press 1992). While in only ten percent of the cases did fathers have sole
custody. Id. at 112. The remaining twenty percent of the cases involved some form of
shared custody. Id. Even in contested custody cases, mothers were granted their
preference for custody two to four times more often than fathers. Id. at 103-104. Other
studies showed fathers to be more successful in custody litigation. See Jeff Atkinson,
Criteria for Deciding Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 Fam. L.Q. 1, 11
(1984) (suggesting that fathers may win up to fifty-one percent of the cases); Nancy D.
Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of the Criteria Used in Child
Custody Determinations, 7 Women's Rights L. Rptr. 235, 236 (1982) (summarizing
studies indicating that fathers succeed in custody cases as much as sixty-three percent
of the time in contested cases). The differences in these statistics are likely attributable
to how paternal success in custody litigation was defined. Id. (arguing that studies
should not count cases in which fathers do not want custody).
The biggest weakness of the studies is that baseline data with which to compare current
outcomes in custody cases is lacking - we simply do not know how often fathers
sought custody of children in the past. My own sense is that even Maccoby and
Mnookin's conservative numbers show an increase in the percentage of fathers who
seek custody and contest a mother's preference for custody today. Also, I believe
fathers are more likely to have and exercise significant custodial rights with their
children today, even where they are not awarded primary physical custody.
167. One of the most visible depictions of the active, engaged father was presented in
the film Kramer v. Kramer (Columbia Picture Corp. 1979) (motion picture). Other
recent films such as Mrs. Doubtfire (Twentieth Cent. Fox 1993) (motion picture)
portray dads trying to stay engaged with their children. Full House (ABC 1987-1995)
(TV series), a popular television sitcom depicted a custodial father parenting his
children alone, with the inept help of two of his friends. Although fathers are often
depicted as buffoons, these images are layered on a well-meaning and engaged dad,
such as in television shows including The Simpsons (Twentieth Cent. Fox TV 1989-
present) (TV series) and movies such as Daddy Day Care (Columbia Picture Corp.
2003). My purpose is not to affirm the stereotypical depiction of fathers in these
television shows and movies; rather, I merely intend to suggest that these modem dads
get their hands dirty doing everything from changing diapers to washing dishes. They
are portrayed as actively engaged with their children.
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disengaged and do not pay child support as "deadbeat dads."
' 16 8
The increasing role of fathers in active parenting is often obscured
by a debate regarding the relative roles of men and women in work and
parenting with families.169 Thus, despite changing norms of parenting,
men's and women's political roles within the family structure and
economic spheres have not changed substantially. As Karen
Czapanskiy has pointed out, when it comes to parenting, "men are
volunteers, women are draftees."' 170  By this, Czapanskiy means that
mother's roles within the home and regarding the nurturing of children
are mandatory, while father's roles are largely voluntary. 7 1  Nancy
Dowd, too, points out that historically, "fatherhood," as opposed to
"motherhood," has not been associated with nurturing: "Fatherhood is
defined by the status it can confer upon children, rather than in terms of
responsibilities, obligations, relationship, or nurturing." 172  Dowd
succinctly summarized the entrenched yet changing context in which
fatherhood is defined:
Thus while historically fatherhood existed almost exclusively
within marriage, we have moved to include non-marital fathers
within our legal definition, primarily in order to obtain monetary
support for children. At the same time, notions of gender equity
have removed formal barriers to the custody and nurture of
168. The term "deadbeat dads" has been used to describe child support obligors who
fail to meet their obligations. Internet sites have arisen in which their faces appear on
"wanted posters." See e.g. Miss. Dept. of Human Servs., Division of Child Support
Enforcement: 10 Most Wanted, http://www.mdhs.state.ms.us/mswant.html (last
accessed Mar. 30, 2005); Wantedpostersdotcom, http://www.wantedposters.com (last
accessed Mar. 30, 2005). See also David Ray Papke, State v. Oakley, Deadbeat Dads,
and American Poverty, 26 W. New. Eng. L. Rev. 9, 20-24 (2004) (discussing the
"deadbeat dad" phenomenon).
169. Feminist scholars argue that despite the fact that many women have entered the
paid labor force, they still are likely to bear the primary responsibility within the family
for direct parenting of children. The reform of family law around an egalitarian model
has disadvantaged women in the custody arena. See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings:
Myth, Taboo and Child Custody, 1 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 133, 203-223
(1992); Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727, 770-774 (1987).
170. Czapanskiy, supra n. 73, at 1415-1416.
171. Id.
172. Nancy E. Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood, 48 Fla. L. Rev. 523, 527 (1996).
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children by their fathers, although childcare disproportionately
remains in mothers' hands. This acknowledgment of men's ability
to nurture and parent, however, has remained far secondary to
defining men's role as purely economic, within the classic
paradigm of the breadwinner. 
173
Nonetheless, while the general political structure of families and
work has not changed radically, men's roles within the family structure
are evolving as are men's expectations regarding parenting. Even
though men may still be, in large measure "volunteers," and men's
success is still defined outside the family structure, in today's culture a
"good man" is an active and engaged parent. This expectation of
engagement is driving men's decision to pursue relationships with their
children.
C. STATE LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO PRESERVE A MORE
TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO ADOPTION
States have responded to the Court's confused jurisprudence on
unwed fathers and to the increasing activism of fathers seeking parental
rights in two general ways. The first group - the "substantive states" -
are those that have left the question of whether a father's commitment
is substantial enough to merit recognition for evaluation on a case-by-
case basis within a larger procedural framework. 174 Other states - the
"procedural states" - have adopted procedures intended to sort fathers
with actual interests inparenting their children from those who do not
have such an interest. 175 In both groups, however, state legislation is
characterized by an antipathy toward unwed fathers, assumptions that
they are generally not truly interested in stating parenting their
173. Nancy E. Dowd, From Genes, Marriage and Money to Nurture: Redefining
Fatherhood, 10 Cardozo Women's L.J. 132, 132-133 (2003).
174. Forman, supra n. 98, at 1007.
175. Id. at 1001. Forman divides the states into those that require compliance with
technical requirements and those that evaluate whether the father has a "substantial
commitment to parenting." See Rebeca Aizpuru, Protecting the Unwed Fathers'
Opportunity to Parent: A Survey of Paternity Registry Statutes, 18 Rev. Litig. 703, 705
(1999) (explaining the idea behind state paternity registries); Kimberly Barton, Who's
Your Daddy?: State Adoption Statutes and the Unknown Biological Father, 32 Cap. U.
L. Rev. 113, 127-140 (2003) (cataloging state legislation regarding unwed fathers).
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children, and if they are, they would not be competent parents. 116 This
antipathy results from the desire of state legislatures to cling to a more
traditional model of adoption in which unwed fathers did not play a
substantial role. 177 Thus, while paying lip service to the recognition of
the relationships unwed fathers might form with their children, most
states have sought to dispense with the consent of unwed fathers in
adoption. 1
78
The "procedural states" rely on a procedural framework that
purports to identify those fathers who intend to parent their children
(and presumably who would have substantial relationships with them)
from other fathers, whose father-child relationship need not be
recognized. 179  For example, in Utah, an unwed father's consent to
adoption is only required under the following circumstances: 1) the
father is listed on the child's birth certificate with the consent of the
mother; 18° 2) the father is living in the same household as the child at
the time the mother executes a consent to adoption or relinquishes the
child to an agency and is holding himself out as the child's father;
18 1
and 3) the father files a paternity action and registers notice of that
action with the state's Department of Vital Statistics prior to the
mother's execution of consent to adoption or relinquishment of the
child to an agency. 182  Utah law permits a paternity action to be
initiated prior to the child's birth. 18 3 No specific notice is required to
any father who fails to file a paternity action prior to the mother's
consent to adoption or relinquishment of the child.' 8 4 In fact, the Utah
legislation provides:
176. Id at 1000-1001.
177. Id at 1012.
178. For much of the twentieth century, unmarried men were excluded from the
adoption process. See Clark, supra n. 62, at § 20.2, 855 ("Until 1972 the statute in the
various states generally provided that the consent of the mother of an illegitimate child
would alone be sufficient to make the child available for adoption .. "); Robert M.
Horowitz & Howard A. Davidson, Legal Rights of Children, Family Law Series 234
(Shepard's/McGraw Hill 1984); Harry Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 32
(The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1971).
179. Forman, supra n. 98, at 1004.
180. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(l)(e) (2005).
181. Id. at § 78-30-4.14(2)(a)(iii).
182. Id at § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(i)-(ii).
183. Id. at § 78-30-4.13(3)(a) (2005).
184. See id at § 78-30-4 .13(7)(c).
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An unmarried, biological father, by virtue of the fact that he has
engaged in a sexual relationship with a woman, is considered to be
on notice that a pregnancy and an adoption proceeding regarding
that child may occur, and has a duty to protect his own rights and
interests. He is therefore entitled to actual notice of a birth or an
adoption proceeding with regard to that child only as provided in
this section. 
185
There are a number of variations among the procedural states.
Some require that the notice of intent to claim paternity be filed within
a specific period of time, such as thirty days after the child's birth.
186
Regardless of the variations, these statutes share the common
characteristic that an unwed father's claim is dependent upon
compliance with procedural requirements and not upon the facts of his
relationship with the child's mother or with the child.
The approach of the procedural states is particularly troubling
because the statutes are explicitly anti-father. The Idaho legislature
made extensive and antagonistic findings regarding fathers. Among
other findings, the legislature determined:
1. "An unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that
acquires constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely
and full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during
pregnancy and upon the child's birth."
' 187
2. "The legislature prescribes the conditions for determining
whether an unmarried biological father's action is sufficiently prompt
and substantial to require constitutional protection."
188
3. "If an unmarried biological father fails to grasp the
opportunities to establish a relationship with his child.., his...
parental interest may be lost entirely.' 89
4. "If an unmarried... father is presumed to know that the child
185. Id. at § 78-30-4.13(1). Idaho's statutory scheme is very similar to Utah's. See
e.g. Idaho Code §§ 16-1504, 16-1505, 16-1513.
186. Ala. Code § 26-10C-1(i) (2004); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-106.01(B) (West
1999); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 50/12.1(b) (West 1999).
187. Idaho Code § 16-1501A(2)(e) (1998).
188. Id. at § 16-1501A(3)(a).
189. Id. at § 16-1501A(3)(b).
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may be adopted without his consent unless he strictly complies with the
provisions of this chapter, manifests a prompt and full commitment to
his parental responsibilities, and establishes paternity."
' 190
Although many other states have not included such extensive
negative findings in their statutes governing the rights of unwed fathers
in adoption, the statutory schemes are nonetheless built around an
assumption of disinterest or incompetence of unwed fathers assuming
(or hoping) that unwed fathers are neither willing nor competent
parents on their own.
The hallmark of the substantive states is that courts must evaluate
the substantive quality of the unwed father's relationship with either
the child or with the child's mother. These states require that notice of
adoptions be provided to men based on various factors such as whether
they lived with and/or supported the mother during her pregnancy,
whether they lived with the child or held themselves out as the father of
the child, or whether they maintained contact with the child. 191 Some
of these states provide for "putative father registries." 192  However,
registration is only one way for a father to be eligible for notice, and
failure to register does not automatically disqualify a father from
seeking recognition of his relationship with the child.
While the substantive states are not characterized by the negative
findings of some of the procedural states, they suffer from their own
form of systematic bias against fathers. It is difficult for a father to
establish a record of substantial commitment to parenting when the
child is a newborn 193 or when the mother thwarts his attempts.
190. Id. at § 16-1501A(3)(e).
191. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 710.39(2) (West 2004) (father's parental rights may
be terminated if he does not establish or seek a custodial relationship with the child);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(4) (2004) (father entitled to notice of an adoption if
he has provided "reasonable and consistent" support for the mother or child and has
attempted to communicate with the mother or child); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 109.096(b)
(2003) (putative father is entitled to notice if he has "repeatedly tried" to contribute to
child's support); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-1690(A)(5)(a)-(b) (Westlaw current through
2004 Reg. Sess.) (father of newborn entitled to notice of adoption if he lived with the
child or the child's mother and held himself out as the father, or provided financial
support to the mother during pregnancy or provided financial support to the child). See
also Unif. Putative & Unknown Fathers Act § 5 (2003) (providing for consideration of
a number of factors in evaluating an unwed father's relationship with his child).
192. See e.g. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 109.096.
193. Deborah Forman has developed a critique of the "substantial commitment"
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Moreover, the objection to adoption by an unwed father almost
necessitates litigation. Without facts, and facing costly litigation,
fathers often lose or give up.
Neither the procedural approach nor the substantive approaches to
the recognition of unwed fathers' rights in adoption have discouraged
litigation. Utah, one of the strictest procedural states, has had
substantial litigation over adoption notice. 194  New York and
California, leading examples of the substantive approach to recognition
of unwed fathers, also have seen extensive litigation.
195
IV. RESOLVING THE LITIGATION CRISIS
There are many approaches to resolving litigation arising from the
complex series of forces detailed here. Certainly, rationalizing the
substantive standards for recognition of fathers' relationships with their
non-marital children is one. 19 Such solutions will be more effective if
state legislatures can move beyond stereotypes of unwed fathers and
mothers toward legislation rooted more clearly in reality.
Substantive solutions to the problem of litigation at the moment
of adoption can only go so far, however. Complex human behaviors
and conflicting relationships will ensure that there is always some
controversy between birth mothers, birth fathers, and prospective
adoptive parents. Thus, in addition to reforming substantive
approach concluding that it is the best approach to the resolution of the unwed father
problem at adoption. Forman, supra n. 98, at 1014-1018. See also Scott A. Resnik,
Seeking the Wisdom of Solomon: Defining the Rights of Unwed Fathers in Newborn
Adoptions, 20 Seton Hall Legis. J. 363, 397-398 (1996).
194. Cases arising from Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.13 and its immediate
predecessors have gone up to the Utah appellate courts four times since 1996. See
generally In re B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999); In re B.T.D., 68 P.3d 1021 (Utah
App. 2003); In re S.L.F., 27 P.3d 583 (Utah App. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Sanchez
v. Fluhman, 40 P.3d 1135 (Utah 2001); Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892 (Utah App.
1996), cert. denied, 936 P.2d 407 (Utah 1997).
195. California has had at least sixteen appellate cases since 2002. See e.g. In re
T.T., 2004 WL 2472638 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. Nov. 4, 2004); In re Kyle F., 112 Cal.
App. 4th 538; In re Lauren K.-S., 2003 WL 1605786 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Mar. 27,
2003); Steven L. v. Tracy W, 2003 WL 116142 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Jan. 14, 2003); In
re Jonah C., 2002 WL 1733628 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. July 26, 2002). For a detailed
discussion of the early New York cases, see Forman, supra n. 98, at 1008-1015.
196. Forman suggests the adoption of a version of the "substantial commitment"
standard. Forman, supra n. 98, at 1039.
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approaches to fathers' rights, states must address the procedural context
of adoption litigation and must take special steps to ensure that such
litigation is resolved swiftly and accurately with the goal of facilitating
stable placement of the child either with adoptive parents or with one
or both of the child's birth parents. To manage litigation at the moment
of adoption in a way that most accurately assesses parental rights and
stabilizes adoption, states should ensure that all known or reasonably
ascertainable birth fathers are notified of adoption proceedings. States
should also adopt procedures to hear the factual bases for unwed
fathers' claims or reasons why an unwed father has not been notified of
the action. Such procedures could be modeled on the expedited
procedures in place in some states to allow minors to bypass parental
consent requirements in abortion.
A. PROVIDE ACTUAL NOTICE TO ALL KNOWN OR REASONABLY
ASCERTAINABLE UNMARRIED FATHERS
Given my argument that there is a growing expectation by men
that they will be involved in parenting their children, any system that
finalizes an adoptive placement without notifying the father risks
increased litigation at the moment of adoption. Neither of the fathers
was notified in the cautionary tales that began this Article.197 Lack of
notice also characterizes cases, such as Baby Jessica 19 8 and Baby
Richard, 199 that have captured the public's attention. In many cases
the father is known to the parties and disclosed to the court, but does
not receive notice. 20 The philosophy of omitting notice to such
197. See supra nn. 1-2 and accompanying text. See also Doe, 88 P.3d at 751-752:
RFS advised the Mother that it was her decision whether to tell the
Father of the adoption. [Tjhe Mother testified the Father did not
know she was proceeding with the adoption and that he was opposed
to placing the baby. The Father received no notice of the [] hearing.
198. See In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Mich. 1993), cert. denied sub nom.
DeBoer v. Schmidt, 509 U.S. 1301 (1993) (The birth mother testified that she lied as to
who the father of the child was and, as a result, he was not notified of the parental
termination action and of the release of the child for adoption.).
199. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 326 (I11. 1995) (stating the birth mother told the
birth father that the baby died at birth, and although prospective adoptive parents and
their attorney knew of the lie, no notice of the adoption was provided to the birth
father).
200. See e.g. In re B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 547 (La. 1990) (birth father visited mother
at hospital and was known to prospective adoptive parents but not permitted to
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known or reasonably ascertainable 20 1 fathers seems to be rooted in fear
that the father will object if he knows of the adoption and that
evaluating his relationship with the child will be too time-consuming,
expensive, or unpredictable.
20 2
As a matter of policy, however, not notifying the adoptive father
is a shortsighted method of accomplishing the policy objective of
stabilizing adoptive placement. First, if birth fathers are going to
object to an adoption, it would be better to find out sooner rather than
later. Upsetting adoptive placements after a child has formed an
attachment to the adoptive parents is harmful to the child.2 °3
Moreover, once placement occurs without the participation of the
committed birth father the positions of the parties become polarized.
Experience seems to indicate that birth fathers may challenge (and
upset) adoptions even after they are final. Notice would, in all
likelihood, cause such objections to surface sooner and permit them to
be resolved earlier in the process with less disruptive impact.
Moreover, the secrecy with which these cases move forward may, in
itself, result in polarization and mistrust leading to litigation that might
participate in adoption); In re McLarrin, 865 So. 2d at 319-321 (great-grandparents
adopting a four-year-old child knew identity of birth father but did not provide him
notice); Beltran, 926 P.2d at 899-900 (Billings, J., dissenting) (noting that both the
mother and LDS Social Services were fully aware of the father's opposition to the
adoption but did not notify him); Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 735 (W. Va. 1998)
(commenting attorney for birth mother knew identity of birth father and actively
concealed information).
201. This standard comes from the preeminent U.S. Supreme Court case regarding
the notice requirement in civil litigation, Mullane v. C. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 320 (1950). By relying on the Mullane standard, I do not mean to suggest
that notice to all unwed fathers is constitutionally required. Clearly, the Court in Lehr
authorized parental termination without such notice under some circumstances. See
supra nn. 114-140 and accompanying text. However, I am suggesting that, as a matter
of policy, states require notice to unwed fathers. In that context, the Mullane definition
of what constitutes effective notice makes sense.
202. Discussing New York's registry statute which permits completely dispensing
with notice under some circumstances, the Court in Lehr noted, "[t]he New York
Legislature concluded that a more open-ended notice requirement would merely
complicate the adoption process, threaten the privacy interests of unwed mothers,
create the risk of unnecessary controversy, and impair the desired finality of adoption
decrees." 463 U.S. at 264. See also Hamilton, supra n. 62, at 992-998 (discussing the
public policy considerations involved in notifying unwed fathers).
203. See supra nn. 48-49 and accompanying text.
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not otherwise take place. 204  Notice may serve to give voice to a
father's concerns, thereby defusing his fears and facilitating the
placement. Finally, requiring notice to unwed fathers can help curb
bad conduct by the mother and prospective adoptive parents.
20 5
One of the reasons fathers are not notified is that mothers refuse
to disclose the father's identity, are not certain of his identity, or lie
about his identity.206  Significant debate has taken place regarding
whether birth mothers should be compelled to disclose the identity of
the birth father. Many states have taken a very protective approach to
the mother on this issue, declining to require disclosure. Scholars
are split on the question of requiring mothers to disclose the identity of
the father.208  The reasons for not requiring disclosure include
204. One unwed father wrote: "When I saw the publication notice stating that the
unknown father had been 'sued,' I became angry. When I saw a 'father information
sheet' left almost blank, and a court order stating that the parental rights of the
unknown father were forever terminated, I was furious." Smith, supra n. 54, at [ 5].
205. See supra Section I.A., "Tale of the Teenage Father and Mother." The parties
proceeded with a parental termination action in a forum that lacked venue and
convinced the court that the father was not truly interested in pursing parental rights.
Although the action was styled as the prospective adoptive parents versus the birth
parents, the parties were not truly adverse. In fact, the same lawyer represented both
the mother and the prospective adoptive parents. Everyone who was made a party to
the action wanted the adoption to go through. The court, viewing the case as just one
more on a busy docket, did not see the "red flags."
206. See In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 326 (discussing that not only did the mother
lie, but the adoptive parents and their attorney knew of the lie and participated in the
mother's deception of the birth father); In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 652 (noting the
birth mother initially lied about the father's identity) The reasons for these deceptions
are complex and it is a mistake, in my view, to vilify the mothers for engaging in them.
207. Forman, supra n. 98, at 1028-1034 (discussing the different approaches to the
question of declining disclosure to require disclosure). See also Hamilton, supra n. 62,
at 987-990; Stacey Lynn Hill, Putative Fathers and Parental Interests: A Search for
Protection, 65 Ind. L.J. 939, 957-960 (1990) (discussing measures states should
undertake to protect a father's right to notice); Teanna West Neskora, Student Author,
The Constitutional Rights of Putative Fathers Recognized in Louisiana's New
Children's Code, 52 La. L. Rev. 1009, 1038-1043 (1992) (expressing concern that
Louisiana state law provides mothers with a means of circumventing a father's right to
notice); Jeffrey A. Parness, Participation of Unwed Biological Fathers in Newborn
Adoptions: Achieving Substantive and Procedural Fairness, 5 J. L. & Fam. Stud. 223,
235-236 (2003).
208. Forman, supra n. 98, at 1032-1033 (arguing for disclosure with deference to the
mother in situations involving threats of harassment or where the mother's safety
would be jeopardized). See also Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-expressing Parenthood, 98
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deferring to maternal decision making because the mother is known
and has a stronger interest in the child's future, protecting the privacy
of the mother, reducing barriers mothers might encounter in deciding to
place children for adoption, and protecting the safety of the mother.
20 9
Given what is at stake - the father's constitutionally recognized right to
a relationship with his child and the stability of the familial unit for the
child and adoptive parents - the norm should be disclosure of the
fathers' identity. With the exception of protecting the mother, none of
the rationales for not requiring disclosure justify the forfeiture of the
father's rights by the unilateral act of the mother. Lehr recognized that
states cannot subject a father's relationship to unilateral control by the
mother. Although it permitted termination of the father's rights
without notice, it did so only as a result of a statutory scheme in which
most fathers were likely to be notified and in which the father had the
opportunity to qualify for notice irrespective of the mother's wishes.
210
In addition to the impact on the father's exercise of his constitutional
rights, states should also be concerned about the interests of the child
and the reliance of the adoptive parents on the stability of the adoptive
placement itself.
In cases in which the mother refuses to disclose the birth father's
identity, and his identity is not otherwise reasonably ascertainable, a
court should expect the mother or the adoptive parents to present
reasons on the record for declining disclosure - such as that disclosure
of his identity would jeopardize her safety211 or where the mother truly
Yale L.J. 293, 320-321 (1988); Czapanskiy, supra n. 73, at 1478. Both Bartlett and
Czapanskiy favor requiring disclosure because it would foster responsibility. But see
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Children's Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747, 1803-1804 (1993) (suggesting that
disclosure requirement would not protect the mother's "network of moral
obligation[s]" to herself and those around her).
209. Forman, supra n. 98, at 982-983 (providing a detailed review of cases relying
on each of these rationales as justifications for requiring only maternal consent to
adoption).
210. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264. The Lehr Court justified the use of putative father
registries based on this reasoning. While I believe such registries are useful, see infra
notes 177-180 and accompanying text, alone they have not stemmed the tide of
adoption litigation. Because most registries open the door to adoption without paternal
consent, I do not believe they will stem the tide of litigation.
211. Both Czapanskiy and Forman would excuse a mother from notice in cases
where the birth father had engaged in abusive behavior toward the mother.
Czapanskiy, supra n. 73, at 1479; Forman, supra n. 98, at 1032-1033.
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does not know the identity of the father.
212
Putative father registries can play a major role in finding and
notifying the men most likely to assert their parental rights.
213
However, putative father registries cannot be the only path to notice.
Such registries are currently inherently flawed and they are limited by
jurisdiction.2 14 Many putative fathers, including those with established
relationships, will not register because they do not know of the registry
or understand its importance. 2 15  Finally, registries pose substantial
unresolved constitutional problems where they are used as a basis to
terminate parental relationships of fathers who have admitted paternity
or established relationships with their children. 2 16  Thus, registries
should be viewed as evidence of a father's interest in parenting his
children - a safe harbor for men interested in notice. However, if the
identity of the father is known, he should be provided notice even if he
does not register.
212. This might be the case if the mother was incapacitated at the time she had
intercourser or if she had intercourse with a man she did not know. Florida temporarily
addressed this problem in a particularly intrusive way by requiring that notice be
published in relevant newspapers containing the name and description of the mother,
the unknown father, the date of conception, and the location where the mother believed
conception occurred. See Alison S. Pally, Student Author, Father by Newspaper Ad:
The Impact of In re the Adoption of a Minor Child on the Definition of Fatherhood, 13
Colum. J. Gender & L. 169, 172-175 (2004) (describing Florida's former adoption
notice provisions - Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.087(6) (West Supp. 2005) (repealed 2003); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 63.088(5) (West Supp. 2005) (repealed 2003)).
213. The Supreme Court approved New York's putative father registry in Lehr. 463
U.S. at 264. Registries as a way of providing unwed fathers a way of asserting their
interest in establishing a relationship with their child are discussed in a number of
recent articles. See Barton, supra n. 175, at 127-140; Beck, supra n. 136; see generally
Donna L. Moore, Student Author, Implementing a National Putative Father Registry
by Utilizing Existing Federal/State Collaborative Databases, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev.
1033 (2003).
214. See Beck, supra n. 136, at 1042; Moore, supra n. 213, at 1035.
215. Justice White pointed out the limitations of such registries in his dissent in Lehr.
463 U.S. at 274-275 (White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
216. See Doe, 88 P.3d at 751-752 (The trial court held that the father's rights could
be terminated without notice because he did not register in Idaho's putative father
registry, even though he had executed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity.).
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B. ESTABLISH A MANDATORY EXPEDITED PROCEDURE FOR
EVALUATING FATHERS' CLAIMS
For all the attempts to expedite these cases, no state has seriously
implemented a procedure that permits swift resolution of unmarried
fathers' claims.217  Even where fathers are notified, cases can drag
through the system interminably. 218 The chief lesson of the cases since
Stanley is that the potential for litigation exists no matter what
substantive standard states adopt to determine whether the consent of
unwed fathers is necessary. The expectations of an increasing number
of men that they will be involved in parenting their children ensures
that their goals will continue to conflict with the choices of birth
mothers and adoptive parents. This is not to say that the substantive
standard employed to evaluate the parenting claims of unwed fathers is
not important. But, because litigation of adoption is inherently harmful
to children and to the adoption system, it is imperative that states adopt
an exhibited procedure for evaluating the claims of unwed fathers.
In developing an efficient system for evaluating claims, states
should look to the judicial bypass procedure employed in minors'
consent to abortion cases. 2 19  The central requirement of the minor
abortion rights cases relevant in the unwed father adoption context is
that the Supreme Court required states to adopt a timely procedure for
reviewing minor's claims. 20 In response to the Supreme Court's
directive in the minor consent cases, most states requiring parental
consent for a minor's abortion developed judicial bypass provisions
that permit review of the minor's claims swiftly enough to allow the
217. Litigation in contested adoptions is painfully time consuming. Even the cases
that move quickly can stretch out for several months. In re Williams was resolved very
quickly - the child was returned to the birth father in a little over three months. See
supra Section I.A.
218. Typical of the reported cases are periods of up to two years. See e.g. Doe, 88
P.3d at 749, 752.
219. The general judicial bypass procedure in minor consent to abortion cases was
outlined by the Supreme Court in its decision in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)
(known in abortion rights analysis as "Bellotti I" because it was the second appeal
considered by the Supreme Court in the litigation regarding Massachusetts' minor
consent to abortion law). Karen Czapanskiy has suggested such an approach to
determine whether mothers should be relieved of the responsibility of identifying the
father in adoption cases. Czapanskiy, supra n. 73, at 1478-1479.
220. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643.
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minor to obtain the abortion if a bypass was granted.
The procedure established by states under parental involvement
states is instructive. Most states do not require the filing of a highly
formalized pleading. In fact, many states have developed a form
pleading that can be filled out by checking boxes and filling in blanks
on the form.22 1 Once a petition for bypass is filed, most states require
the court to provide a hearing and reach a decision within two to seven
days. 222  Finally, states generally provide for immediate review of a
decision denying a judicial bypass. Time frames for review are
approximately ten days.
223
The questions a court must resolve at a judicial bypass proceeding
involve significant factual issues. The U.S. Supreme Court has held
that states must provide a bypass if a minor is mature enough to make
his or her own decision about abortion or if the court decides that an
221. See e.g. Colorado Judicial Branch, Petition for Waiver of Parental Notification
Requirements of § 12-37.5-104, C.R.S. (available at
http://www.courts.state.co.us/chs/court/forms/udicialbypass/jdfll.pdf) (last accessed
Apr. 4, 2005). Some states require courts to prepare easy step-by-step forms for bypass
applicants. See e.g. La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.5(2)(B)(2) (2005). The Louisiana
statute requires:
Each clerk of each court which has jurisdiction to hear such applications
shall prepare application forms in clear and concise language which shall
provide step-by-step instructions for filling out and filing the application
forms. All application forms shall be submitted to the attorney general for
his approval. Each clerk shall assist each minor who requests assistance
in filling out or filing the application forms.
222. See e.g. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-2152(E) (West 2004) (bypass hearing and
decision must be completed within forty-eight hours excluding weekends); Ga. Code
Ann. § 15-11-113 (Harrison 1998) (hearing must be held within three days of filing
excluding weekends and holidays); La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.5(3)(a) (application
must be heard within four days of filing); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.8(d) (2003)
(requiring all proceedings to be completed within seven days of filing); 18 Pa. Consol.
Stat. Ann. § 3206(f)(1) (West 2000) (hearing must be held within three business days
of filing); Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 33.003(h) (2004) (court must rule by 5:00 p.m. on
second business day after filing).
223. See e.g. Ala. Code § 26-21-4(h) (1992) (appeal must be perfected within five
days); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann § 36-2152(F) (West 2003) (appellate court must hold
hearing and issue a ruling within forty-eight hours after petition for appellate review is
filed); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 442.2555(5) (2000) (notice of appeal required within one day
of ruling and appeal must be perfected within five days); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.8(d)
(hearing on appeal must be held within seven days of filing).
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abortion is in the minor's best interest. 224  These are discretionary
decisions that are rooted in the individual facts of each case.22 5 The
determination of whether an abortion is in a minor's best interest can
involve the evaluation of whether pregnancy will damage the family
structure or irreparably undermine the minor's relationship with her
parents. 226  The mature minor standard requires consideration of a
minor's success in school, future plans, demeanor at the hearing,
appreciation of the physical and emotional consequences of the
abortion, and consideration of alternatives to abortion and their
consequences.227
The example of judicial efficiency achieved by states in the
abortion bypass cases stands as a model for other situations that require
quick and efficient resolution of issues such as the unwed father
consent cases. The procedures employed in the abortion bypass cases
hold the promise of resolving issues within fifteen business days of the
initiation of an action. Even if the timelines were relaxed slightly in
the unwed father situation to reflect the fact that there is no per se
biological clock driving the decision, there is no reason to believe that
unwed father claims to adoption consent could not be resolved within
thirty days from when they arise. To be fair, there are important
differences between the abortion bypass cases and the adoption consent
cases. The most important difference is that abortion bypass cases are
generally uncontested. There is no opposing party because of the
requirement that the minor's confidentiality be preserved. In the
adoption consent cases, there would almost always be an adverse party.
The need to provide an opportunity to be heard to both sides of the
224. Belotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-644.
225. Suellyn Scarnecchia & Julie Kunce Field, Judging Girls: Decision Making in
Parental Consent to Abortion Cases, 3 Mich. J. Gender & L. 75, 81, 83 (1995)
(describing the issues in an abortion bypass case as "hard to define but 'we know it
when we see it' ").
226. Richard F. Storrow & Sandra Martinez, "Special Weight" for Best-Interests
Minors in the New Era of Parental Autonomy, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 789, 807 (discussing
the substantive content of the best interest test in the context of judicial bypass of
parental consent to abortion); Satsie Veith, The Judicial Bypass Procedure and
Adolescents'Abortion Rights: The Fallacy of the "Maturity" Standard, 23 Hofstra L.
Rev. 453, 470 (1994) (arguing that "maturity" is an "amorphous" term).
227. Stephen P. Rosenberg, Student Author, Splitting the Baby: When Can a
Pregnant Minor Obtain an Abortion without Parental Consent?: The Ex Parte
Anonymous Cases (Alabama 2001), 34 Conn. L. Rev. 1109, 1117-1118 (2002).
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adoption litigation could undermine the need for efficiency. However,
in most situations, there is no reason for this delay. Often, the
questions involved in adoption-consent cases are factual and relatively
simple. Most of the reported cases did not involve substantial factual
disputes. 22 8  The two cautionary tales are illustrative. In In re
Williams, there was no dispute about the father's conduct. 229  The
mother and adoptive parents admitted all the relevant facts including
the father's identity in their pleadings. 2 3  The only question was
whether, as a matter of law, the Idaho statutes required notice to a
231father who had done what that father did. In Doe, the question
involved law applied to fact (whether the father's execution of a
Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity entitled the father to notice)
or pure law.
232
Even if the efficiency of the procedure is lost in a few cases in
which the parties get caught up in complex factual issues, in many
cases, the father's interests will be quickly dealt with - either by
recognizing early in the process that the consent of the father is
required for the adoption or by a finding that the father's consent was
not required because he failed to comply with technical requirements or
because he had not made a substantial commitment to the child. There
is simply no reason to expect that these issues pose any more complex
questions than those raised in abortion bypass proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
The well-being of children in adoption and the integrity of the
adoption system depend on states striking the appropriate balance in
adjudicating the claims of unwed fathers. This balance cannot be
struck by legislation that is based on unrealistic assumptions about the
parties to the adoption, nor can the balance be struck by ignoring
desires and expectations of the men and women whose interests are
involved in the adoption. Finally, the balance can only be struck by
228. There did not appear to be significant dispute about the facts in any of the major
cases (Stanley, Caban, Quilloin, or Lehr). Even in the Baby Jessica and Baby Richard
situations there did not appear to be significant discord over the facts.
229. See supra n. 1 and accompanying text.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 88 P.3d 754.
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providing an efficient and swift system of adjudication. Providing
notice to all the interested parties - including the birth father, while not
constitutionally required - is good policy. Establishing a swift and
efficient system for adjudicating interests protects the child's best
interests and saves the adults involved from extended emotional
controversies and financial loss. Acknowledging the potentially
legitimate claims of fathers and providing a swift mechanism for
adjudicating them protects the integrity of the adoption system itself.
